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Financial Market Assumptions & Models for Pension Plans: 
A Technical Comment on the PIMS Model Assumptions for Asset Markets  
 
Christopher C. Geczy 
 
1. Introduction and Scope 
 In this technical comment, we address a subset of the modeling assumptions of the PIMS 
system developed and employed by the PBGC, focusing our attention on the capital market 
expectations of asset classes assumed to represent holdings of plans insured by the agency as 
well as those asset class allocation assumptions themselves. Examination of such suppositions 
and their modeling implications can of course be quite important. However, we hasten to add 
that without understanding or perhaps guessing about the implications of changes in 
assumptions, the ultimate import of this examination has natural limitations. Nonetheless, what 
follows represents an assessment of a few of what we see as the most important assumptions for 
capital market behavior as well as some apparent quickly moving industry trends that also likely 
affect outputs in important ways and might fruitfully be treated in the modeling assumptions of 
PIMS. While it seems logical that because simulations can be sensitive to certain assumptions 
(and expected outputs are complex functions of inputs) and because we view our comments as 
important both econometrically and as part of powerful industry trends that are potentially 
important to PBGC outcomes, it is surely the case that only when changes to the PIMS capital 
market and asset allocation assumptions are directly incorporated in the model will we come to 
understand the actual importance of what emerges. Finally, it is highly worthwhile to note that 
the PBGC staff is likely to be aware of the ideas outlined in the comment below and have 
indicated at various points in the system documentation and associated literature that future 
versions of the system may include modifications incorporating these ideas. 
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2. Overview of the PIMS Model Assumptions 
 The Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) is a simulation modeling framework 
developed by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) that was “designed to quantify 
the uncertainty that surrounds pension insurance” and to be used as a tool to characterize 
potential distributions of pension insurance claims on the PBGC and, importantly, the agency’s 
surplus (or deficit).1 The PBGC is clear that the system is not a predictive system intended to 
identify point estimates of the future financial condition of the agency but to provide ranges of 
simulated distributions of outcomes (Ibid.). The system has been designed and maintained by the 
agency (presumably with input from outside parties, contractors and other stakeholders via 
various direct interactions with the model as well as via technical reviews such as this one) to 
give an understanding of how pension plans insured by the PBGC behave under various shocks 
to internal and external parameters (which characterize economic and other conditions), 
including being able “accurately [to] portray underfunding among the insured universe under a 
wide variety of economic conditions” as long as the assumptions, constraints and reflections of 
pension plan and governing rule data are accurate. Of course, modeling decisions about 
granularity of the system components and data used and measured must have been made, and the 
system cannot be possibly expected to capture all possible relevant inputs or reflect all possible 
scenarios. 
The system accommodates inputs from a subsample of large insured pensions including 
actuarial inputs such as current plan demographics and benefit formulas, data on the financial 
condition of sponsors, fund portfolio compositions and the PBGC’s own financial position. We 
1 “Pension Insurance Modeling System: PIMS System Description,” Version 1.0, Revision 
9/22/2010. 
 
                                                 
3 
 
understand that, typically, PIMS simulations (say 5,000 or 10,000 in number of draws over 
different economic scenarios) are used, say, to project 10 years of future economic events in the 
financial markets (Overview 2011). First, interest rates, stock returns, and related variables (e.g., 
inflation, wage growth, and multiplier increases in flat-dollar plans) are drawn according to the 
stochastic equations listed in Table 1. In the model, it appears that the 30-year Treasury bond is 
presumed to follow a random walk while corporate bond yields, which are viewed as highly 
correlated over time, are mean reverting to historical estimates of their spread over Treasury 
yields of comparable maturity. Real rates are assumed to be a constant level (e.g., 1.64 percent), 
and inflation is calculated as the as the spread between nominal and real rates. The term structure 
of interest rates does not directly enter into the equations, per se (Overview 2011). 
Returns on equities seem to be modeled as mean reverting to a long run average value 
estimated from historical data (e.g., 10.4 percent plus noise according to one historical document, 
or 8.6 percent or 8.2 percent according to other documents) using data ranging from 1926, which 
is when the famous Stock, Bonds, Bills and Inflation (SBBI) data from Ibbotson begin (PBGC 
FY 2012 Exposure Report, hereafter referred to as Exposure Report). Innovations are drawn IID 
over time, presumably from a calibrated multivariate Gaussian distribution. Correlations between 
stock returns and bond yields appear strictly to be based on historical estimates from the time 
period 1973-2007 (Exposure Report), with the implication being that of contemporaneous 
negative correlation between stock returns and bond yields (also as shown in the 2012 Exposure 
Report, the model assumes a positive correlation between Treasury Bond returns and stocks). 
Plan asset returns are determined by a two factor model that combines stock return premia over 
nominal rates and bond premia, both adjusted for sensitivies to these premia via estimates of beta 
a la a two factor market model, against which plan asset returns are regressed. Note that in a one 
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factor case, this model might be thought of as the time series estimation equation made famous 
by the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964). It is important to note that the PBGC has 
indicated that it has Form 5500 data on reported plan asset allocations, which it incorporates. My 
comments below on the changing nature of plan allocations must be conditioned with this 
information. Historically, asset mixes of plan portfolios have assumed roughly to be a 60 percent 
allocation to equities and 40 percent allocation to bonds (Buck Consultants 2012) or “a 
weighting based on the average of the estimated rate mixtures: 48 percent stock market returns, 
23 percent long-term Treasury bond returns, 30 percent long-term Treasury bond yield and a -2.5 
basis points additive adjustment.” (Exposure Report: 17) With the inclusion of actual Form 5500 
data, the model can incorporate important potential diversification characteristics as outlined 
below. However, modeling the increased span of risks introduced in this manner also may 
require more sophisticated models than the two factor model described above. 
Simulations of the model first appear to presume that sponsors make the minimum 
statutory contributions implied by the tax code. If a sponsor goes bankrupt in the simulation, it 
does not contribute from the previous year. The PBGC adjusts premia based on sponsor 
historical choices to fund plans above the minimum in avoidance of higher premiums. PIMS 
simulations allow plan participants to retire, leave the firm and to die according to actuarial data 
and assumptions. Benefits and salaries for a given age and service time grow with inflation plus 
a productivity factor (Overview 2011 and see Table 1). 
As mentioned above, sponsor health is measured by equity-to-debt ratios, cash flows, 
firm equity, and employment levels. Here, equity-to-debt and cash flow ratios are mean-reverting 
to long run historical averages. Employment and firm equity are essentially modeled as 
correlated random walks. Innovations in the equations for sponsors appearing in Table 1 are 
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assumed to be correlated to one another and to innovations in financial market returns, with 
correlations estimated from history. Finally, bankruptcy is modeled as a random function with 
parameters estimated by historical bankruptcies and data on the health of companies over the 
period 1980 to 1998 (Exposure Report). These data are not industry-specific. If a firm goes 
bankrupt at the same time a plan is less than 80% funded, the plan represents a loss and is 
included in average loss calculations across simulations and scenarios (Exposure Report). 
Formerly, the model incorporated parameter uncertainty by including estimations as part of the 
simulation procedures by estimating certain parameters within simulation iterations. Currently 
parameter uncertainty is no longer accounted for. 
Table 1 here 
 
3. PIMS Capital Market Assumptions vs. the Assumptions of Others 
 Table 2 outlines the baseline capital market expectations used/produced by the PIMS 
system. It also provides a listing of the capital market assumptions recently compiled by Horizon 
Actuarial Services, LLC in its annual survey of seventeen large multi-employer consultancies2. 
While the assumptions utilized by plans insured by the PBGC themselves are not available (at 
least to me), and the use of third party capital market assumptions is fraught with its own 
2 Consultancies included are Callan Associates, CAPTRUST Financial Advisors, A.J. Gallagher 
/ Independent Fiduciary Services, Hewitt EnnissKnupp, Investment Performance Services, LLC, 
R.V. Kuhns & Associates, Marco Consulting Group, Marquette Associates, Meketa Investment 
Group, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley/Graystone Consulting, NEPC, Pension Consulting 
Alliance, The PFM Group, SEI Towers Watson and Wurts & Associates. 
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problems, not the least of which is the prima facie problem that that the respondents are service 
providers to plan sponsors and are paid by them, they serve to raise several important issues for 
consideration. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that when these advisors, as likely 
fiduciaries under both the Advisors Act of 1940 and under ERISA, provide their expectations 
which likely serve as a base for sponsor assumptions, these consultancies are required to provide 
their advice in an un-conflicted manner as required under the law, and these consultancies advise 
both single-employer and multi-employer plans in their fiduciary advisory capacities. Also, they 
use a wide variety of models that are forward looking as well as historical data. 
Table 2 here 
The results in Table 2, Panel A indicate a substantial discrepancy between the expected 
returns used in the PIMS system (where we note that we have multiple sources describing the 
PIMS assumptions)3 and large consultancies who either serve or a like those that serve the plans 
insured by the PBGC. Part of the discrepancy surely arises directly from the fact that 
consultancies have different approaches to assessing future capital market investment 
performance. Apparently, some use forward-oriented models such as a form of the dividend 
discount model for equity returns (for example, possibly accumulating some measure of earnings 
growth, earnings yield or dividend yield, and expected return from multiples expansion as well 
as inflation expectations). Certainly some use historical data or at least calibrate their models 
based on historical data. Such forward-looking models might allow initial conditions important 
3 Here we use those model simulation averages reported in the PBGC FY 2012 Exposure Report 
(2012). However, we also note that the expected returns reported in the Buck Consultants third 
party review very closely resemble those appearing in Table 2. 
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for the accommodation and inclusion time-varying expected returns, critical for the calculation 
of funding ratios and for many conceivable outputs of the model to be incorporated. 
Also, while information is sparse on how all 17 consultancies compute their forecasts, the 
importance of this discrepancy is that if plan sponsors base their allocations on them, and, as a 
result, their allocations and the implications that the portfolios allocations reported via Form 
5500 are potentially more complex that what the two factor model for plan assets may suggest. 
Also, the mere fact that reasonable analysts can rely on different models for asset returns at least 
raises the chalice of testing of robustness by the PBGC with respect to its own assumptions 
regarding its two factor model. 
As we show in Section 5 below, evidence that corporate plans allocate much differently 
than presumed by the PBGC seems undeniable. They allocate to more asset classes that are 
represented in the U.S. stock/bond two-factor model assumption, and some of those allocations 
are to classes of assets that are highly likely to be exposed to risks simply outside the risks of 
U.S. domestic stocks and bonds. Thus, as apparent in the unconditional expected returns, risks 
and correlations assumptions presented in Table 2, higher volatilities for foreign classes and 
classes outside the narrow confines of the PIMS assumption would likely result in higher 
volatilities and more extreme outcomes, were the alterative presumptions to be more accurate. 
Moreover, since the volatility attribution implied by the stock/bond assumption clearly indicates 
that this asset allocation, which has arisen historically in the financial industry (and academic 
literature4) as components in the so-called “balanced” portfolio, is in fact not at all balanced. Its 
risk is heavily dominated by the risk of the equity component of the assumption. All this said, we 
hasten to add that the assumptions of the average consultant may not accurately reflect the 
4 See for example, Brinson, Hood and Beebower (1986). 
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forecasts of reasonable models. In Section 4 below, we turn to models that, in a forward looking 
way, calibrate market expectations. 
 
4. PIMS Capital Market Assumptions and the Stochastic Character of Asset Prices 
  Since no later than the work of Mandelbrot, Fama and others, the non-Gaussian character 
of asset prices has been a topic of intense study in academia and industry. The gist of that body 
of research and practice suggests that asset returns are have greater extremes than presumed by 
the type of stochastic assumption embedded in the PIMS system. In addition, at least one source 
of that heavy-tailed character is the time-varying nature and auto-correlated nature of first and 
higher moments. The PIMS model assumptions on one hand incorporate a form of this 
autocorrelation (e.g., the well-known autocorrelation of bond yields). On the other hand, they 
appear to ignore the time-varying nature of volatility in the short and long runs. 
There are numerous ways to illustrate this critical point. The approach we take here is 
first to illustrate basic levels of predictability in asset returns. We do this graphically (Figure 1, 
Panels A and B), although much research has demonstrated how both reduced form and more 
structural approaches may be estimated econometrically.5 We then make the point that volatility 
is time-varying using implied volatilities in the form of the VIX (Figure 2), ex post realized 
volatilities over the long run (Figure 3, Panels A and B), demonstrating the strongly different 
implications for the assumption of time-varying volatility for outcomes with a greater frequency 
of extremes in simulations. 
Figures 1-3 here 
5 Although we hasten to add that some researchers like Welch (2008) indicate that much of the 
predictability documented in the academic finance literature arises due to data mining. 
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Since PBGC insurance both conceptually and as modeled in PIMS is expected to pay at 
times when plans are underfunded and sponsors are in distress, having a more accurate 
representation of equity market extremes seems quite important. Moreover, the diversification 
benefits normally attributed to asset allocation varies with time and with market volatility. We 
show below – again, graphically (Figures 4 and 5) – how the correlation between stocks and 
bonds varies across both business and volatility cycles. 
Figures 4 and 5 here 
To illustrate the first point, Figure 1, Panel A relates starting 5-year Treasury yields 
(same axes) to future annualized returns on Treasuries from January 1955-January 2013, and 
Figure 1, Panel B relates the current dividend yield on U.S. Large Cap stocks (reflected most 
recently in the S&P 500) over the period January 1871 – January 2013. Both graphs make two 
strong points, ones that the academic literature has spent considerable effort in understanding 
over approximately the last three decades. First, the graphs imply that it is impossible to assert 
that either equity returns are simply random walks with IID innovations or that bond returns are 
simply mean reverting with IID innovations. Also, since the entire term structure of interest rates 
clearly is important for model outcomes across the future time span of simulations, it might be 
highly useful to incorporate, factor models for the term structure. Second, the investment 
opportunity set is highly time-varying and correlates strongly with simple instruments (for 
instance, the period correlation between d/p and subsequent 7-year return in Figure 1, Panel B is 
just under 70 percent). Especially since insurance claims are a strong function of these two 
forcing variables in the PIMS system and since they track economic conditions, it may be useful 
to incorporate this notion into the assumptions of the model.  
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 Another feature of real-world data that today does not appear to be as controversial as it 
was when first introduced is the property of asset returns to have fat tails, highly autocorrelated 
conditional volatilities and time-varying implied volatilities that reflect the pricing of systematic 
risk. Again, there may be innumerable ways to make this point, and one guesses that there may 
be thousands of academic and practitioner papers and dissertations written on the topic, but we 
again here take a graphical approach (later we build a simulation model that accommodates time-
varying volatility). Figure 2 presents the Chicago Board of Options Exchange VIX index over 
the period January 2007 – December 2012 (CBOE 2013), and Figure 3, Panel A presents ex post 
realized volatility estimated over 18-month rolling windows. Both graphs tell a similar story of 
time-varying volatility with that variation corresponding to business and market cycles over a 
recent period of market disruption and, in fact, in the very long run (at least by U.S. standards). 
Moreover, 99 percent of positive daily changes in the VIX index correlate with negative S&P 
500 index returns. That is, equity values are negatively correlated with increases in volatility. 
Finally, over the long run, cycles like those apparent in the recent financial crisis are reflected in 
realized volatility. Again, while sophisticated modeling assumptions and technologies capturing 
this effect may take many different forms, the graphs point out clearly that the modeling 
assumptions of the PIMS system may usefully incorporate conditional heteroskedasticity in asset 
returns, or at least for equity returns, likely the most important source of systematic variability in 
plan and in fact corporate solvency, on average. 
 To illustrate this point, Figure 3, Panel B incorporates our understanding of the PIMS 
equity return assumptions from Table 1 in modeling simulated returns that are either random 
walks like those from the PIMS model (which we label “IID”) or a calibrated random walk 
(cleverly labeled “Calibrated”) using in-sample estimates of the period represented by each point 
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on the graph for actual returns. Apparent in this graph is that the actual spikes in volatility arising 
in the real world are not reflected in the IID approach of the PIMS model estimated based on 
long-run, constant variance assumptions. Moreover, while local calibration helps over the rolling 
horizons of the model (and it should, as it benefits from perfect hindsight!), it is not able to 
match the observed spikes in volatility in the historical record. The implication of these figures is 
that, again, because volatility is so strongly inversely correlated with bad outcomes for asset 
valuations, in our view a model of insurance may fruitfully incorporate these effects. 
 Unfortunately, it turns out that spikes in volatility due, in our view, both to characteristics 
of asset returns themselves and possibly to ancillary effects (like runs on liquidity that arise 
during financial crises and times of systemic stress, which have happened so commonly 
throughout modern human history (e.g., see Kindleberger and Aliber 2012)). One way among 
many to understand this effect is to think simply how components of classes of assets like those 
to which insured plans have exposure relate in their variations to the classes as a whole. 
Consider, for example, the traditional portfolio theoretic measure, R2. The fundamental 
definition of R2 for an asset in an investment context is as the ratio of its systematic (e.g., 
market) risk to its total risk which is the sum of systematic and idiosyncratic, non-market risk. 
The previous figures indicate that the numerator and the first part of the denominator, systematic 
or market risk, change over time and with widespread pricing of equity risk, and, at times, spike. 
Unless idiosyncratic risk compensates for changes in systematic risk, R2s may vary as well. 
Moreover, formulaically, R2 is defined as the square of correlation between the asset and the 
asset class being modeled. That is, just when the diversification power of lower-than-higher 
correlations are most important, they may be fleeting. Altogether, this indicates that just when 
assumptions about constant correlations may be important, they may actually go up. This effect 
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may be especially important to the PBGC because sponsor contributions are functions of 
financial distress of sponsor firms, which is likely correlated with shocks common to equities. 
Even more, PBGC assets may themselves be subject to this behavior, making claims (and other 
difficult outcomes) and their backstop move more negatively in bad times. To illustrate this 
point, Figure 4 plots the implied correlations of the S&P 500 components via the term structure 
of the CBOE S&P 500 implied correlation indexes,6 JCJ, KCJ and ICJ, over time, in which it is 
notable that correlations implied by options prices are both time-varying and correlated with 
volatility spikes in the previous graphs. Finally, Figure 5, Panels A and B plot rolling realized 
correlations between and index of U.S. large cap stocks (represented most recently by the S&P 
500) with 20-year Treasury returns, without and with 95% confidence intervals. While the PIMS 
model assumptions presume a fairly strong negative correlation between stock and bond yields, 
and a positive correlation between stock and Treasury Bond returns, it is clear at least from the 
perspective of Figure 5, this last presumption may be appropriate only at certain times. It may be 
useful to note that the times of particularly negative observed correlations in Figure 5 often arise 
over estimation periods covering intervals of market distress, perhaps making the PIMS 
stock/bond return correlation assumption a bit removed from market experience. Again, more 
generally, it may be beneficial for the PIMS system to incorporate time-varying second moments 
in a multivariate context for asset returns, particularly if, as discussed in Section 5, the system 
would be moving toward consideration of more asset classes than just the components of the 
stock/bond portfolio in the modeling of plan allocations. 
6 See http://www.cboe.com/micro/impliedcorrelation/.  
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5. PIMS and Models for Capital Market Expectations 
As the treatment in Section 2 above highlights, there exist strong differences between the 
capital market assumptions for the simple asset classes of the PIMS model and the assumptions 
of large consultancies assumed to be providing investment advice to the sponsors of insured 
plans. To assess further the PIMS assumptions about equities, we estimate two additional models 
for future asset returns, focusing on equity returns: The dividend discount model and a model 
based upon dividend yield as an instrument which accommodates the time-varying nature of 
expected returns in the academic and practitioner literature. With respect to future expected 
returns on bonds, the evidence in Figures 1a and 1b relating yields to future returns over time 
indicates that, based on the assumption of current yields being unbiased predictors of future 
returns (an assailable presumption, but a reasonable one here as long as residual correlations are 
maintained), future bond returns might actually be quite a bit lower than presumed by the PIMS 
systems, based upon our assessment. While this indication is not a direct comment about the 
modeling character of the system, it points out a difference that arises based upon modeling 
choices of the system. 
 
6. Asset and Risk-Based Allocations of Pension Plans and Their Implications 
 In this section we demonstrate that the asset allocation of the PIMS system, which in a 
sense presumes a domestic stock/bond split, does not comport with the allocation of many plans 
today or with trends in plan allocations and, thus, may not reflect the actual risk of plans on 
average. The risks of those plans differ substantially from that of the so-called “balanced” 
approach of the famous 60/40 allocation, which is in the PIMS model essentially a U.S.-based 
model, based on its two factor model assumption. First, Table 3 provides allocations across a 
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fairly highly aggregated depiction of asset classes from various sources in the PIMS 
documentation set as well as for U.S. corporate plans, U.S. public plans and a sample of U.S. 
defined benefit plans (the largest 100 corporate plans in 2012), according to Pensions & 
Investments Research (2013). The column labeled PIMS Model refers to the allocations reported 
to me assumed in the Exposure Report, and the columns labeled Single Employer Funds/Plans 
represent a summary and subjective aggregation of the allocations reported in the PBGC Annual 
Report for 2012. The columns labeled as corporate and public plans are also those that appear for 
2011 in Figure 6, Panels A-C from the P&I annual plan surveys. 
Table 3 here 
 Table 3 indicates that the U.S. stock/bond assumption of the two factor PIMS assumption 
for plan assets quite different from plan allocations across the board which recently have lower 
levels of equity allocations than the assumption of PIMS. In addition, the allocations observed 
for plans in the real world are more diversified into alternatives. Moreover, as indicated above, 
the PIMS model assumptions are calibrated to U.S. data, again an assumption which does not 
match reality, although due to the aggregations in Table 3, those subtleties are averaged away. 
The bottom line is that pension plans insured by the PBGC have potentially drastically different 
allocations (implying vastly different effective capital market assumptions) than the PIMS 
system contemplates, either on a dollar basis or on a “risk allocation” or variance contribution 
basis (see Table 4). In addition, with the inclusion of increasing allocations to alternative 
investments (see Figure 6, Panel C, for instance), PBGC insured plans are taking on risks not 
even contemplated by the PIMS model. It is useful to note that in one sense, the over-allocation 
in the model assumptions to equity risks may actually be conservative if less accurate than 
matching observed allocations reported by plans on Form 5500 might be. Domestic equity risk 
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dominates the risk allocation of the 60/40 allocation historically and in the capital market 
assumptions-based Table 3. More diversified plans may in fact have fewer incidences of 
underfunding as a result if those alternative allocations do indeed end up providing 
diversification benefits on average and at times of general market distress. 
Table 4 and Figure 6 here 
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The financial market assumptions of the PIMS system, which is itself apparently a highly 
sophisticated, thoughtfully constructed and quite useful simulation tool for the PBGC, are 
nonetheless ones upon which it is possible to improve. While here it is impossible – without 
running the system itself with suggested changes beyond those illustrated above – to confirm 
how useful suggestions provided here might prove to be, the issues we point out arise directly 
from characteristics of the real-world investment environment. The time-varying nature of asset 
returns described here and the associated potential liabilities of ignoring their characteristics may 
be especially pronounced in the short put setting of an insurer of pension plans. With the heavy-
tailed behavior of markets that extends the likelihood of extreme events being outside the PIMS 
assumptions, and with those extreme events connected to the time-varying nature of higher 
moments of asset returns, we believe it is important to consider both as part of the innovation 
path of the model as it continues to live and breathe. In addition, because not only risks and 
rewards change over time in markets but also because the allocations of plan portfolios can and 
have changed over time in a manner that sees them admitting risks not necessarily related to the 
stock and bond risk of the model, it is potentially quite important for the model to reflect those 
changes in its assumptions. That said, the heavy equity allocation of the model may have an 
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upside in that equity risk, while it has enjoyed a high reward to risk ratio (in the U.S. at least), is 
a strong contributor to overall plan volatility. In other words, there is one sense in which it might 
be viewed as conservative with respect to extremes of plan performance that might not otherwise 
have been diversified away. Nonetheless, the use of long-run historical data from the United 
States, without consideration of the upward bias that the U.S. equity experience represents, may 
be adding an unintended layer of risk important for the agency. 
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Table 1 PIMS Equations 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Pension Insurance Modeling System: PIMS System Description,” Version 1.0, 
Revision 9/22/2010. 
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Table 2 Capital Market Expected Returns and Volatilities: PIMS vs. Others 
 
Asset Class E[R] StdDev E[R] StdDev Avg Return StdDev
Horizon CME's 5.40% 10.30% 7.31% 11.04% - -
US Equity - Large Cap 9.37% 18.23% 11.67% 18.75%
US Equity - Small/Mid Cap 10.54% 23.01% 13.12% 19.89%
Non-US Equity - Developed 9.89% 20.41% 10.27% 17.26%
Non-US Equity - Emerging 12.61% 28.27% 14.64% 24.15%
US Fixed Income - Investment 4.13% 5.89% 6.20% 6.73%
US Fixed Income - High Yield 7.37% 12.28% 6.05% 10.54%
Non-US Fixed Income - Developed 3.77% 7.28% 7.42% 7.69%
Non-US Fixed Income - Emerging 7.23% 13.21% 10.55% 12.72%
Treasuries (Cash Equivalents) 3.00% 0.90% 2.77% 1.89% 3.31% 0.65%
TIPS (Inflation-Protected) 3.49% 6.01% 6.89% 5.76%
Real Estate 7.56% 11.73% 4.18% 21.92%
Hedge Funds 7.25% 9.00% 7.29% 5.80%
Commodities 7.29% 18.72% 5.72% 14.97%
Infrastructure 8.29% 13.78% 10.25% 12.90%
Private Equity 12.90% 25.14% 12.42% 22.30%
3.00% 6.80%
HistoricalHorizonPIMS System
8.20% 20.60%
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 3 Capital Market Expected Correlations: PIMS vs. Horizon 
 
Asset Class Correlations
Long-Term Treasury Yield
Return on 30-yr Treasury Bond -0.29 1.00
Equity -0.11 0.23 1.00  
 
Asset Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 US Equity - Large Cap 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.68 0.19 0.62 0.07 0.51 0.03 0.02 0.33 0.58 0.25 0.55 0.76
2 US Equity - Small/Mid Cap 0.86 1.00 0.71 0.66 0.11 0.59 0.02 0.48 0.00 -0.02 0.23 0.55 0.23 0.50 0.71
3 Non-US Equity - Developed 0.80 0.71 1.00 0.72 0.13 0.55 0.25 0.45 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.58 0.32 0.55 0.67
4 Non-US Equity - Emerging 0.68 0.66 0.72 1.00 0.05 0.54 0.10 0.59 -0.02 0.06 0.23 0.58 0.36 0.54 0.59
5 US Fixed Income - Investment 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.05 1.00 0.34 0.49 0.44 0.23 0.65 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.19 0.04
6 US Fixed Income - High Yield 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.34 1.00 0.16 0.61 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.47 0.24 0.52 0.52
7 Non-US Fixed Income - Developed 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.10 0.49 0.16 1.00 0.26 0.12 0.43 -0.04 0.11 0.13 0.32 -0.01
8 Non-US Fixed Income - Emerging 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.59 0.44 0.61 0.26 1.00 0.05 0.28 0.05 0.46 0.27 0.42 0.39
9 Treasuries (Cash Equivalents) 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.05 1.00 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.04
10 TIPS (Inflation-Protected) 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.65 0.22 0.43 0.28 0.16 1.00 0.06 0.15 0.28 0.22 -0.04
11 Real Estate 0.33 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.05 0.22 -0.04 0.05 0.13 0.06 1.00 0.23 0.26 0.35 0.38
12 Hedge Funds 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.15 0.47 0.11 0.46 0.11 0.15 0.23 1.00 0.37 0.48 0.52
13 Commodities 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.36 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.26 0.37 1.00 0.37 0.26
14 Infrastructure 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.54 0.19 0.52 0.32 0.42 0.05 0.22 0.35 0.48 0.37 1.00 0.50
15 Private Equity 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.04 0.52 -0.01 0.39 0.04 -0.04 0.38 0.52 0.26 0.50 1.00  
 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 4 Asset Allocations and Risk (Variance Contribution) Allocations Assumed by PIMS and Selections of Pension Plans 
 
Asset Allocation Risk Allocation Asset Allocation Risk Allocation Asset Allocation Risk Allocation Asset Allocation Risk Allocation Asset Allocation Risk Allocation Asset Allocation Risk Allocation
Equity 60.0% 92.3% 48.0% 84.6% 64.8% 92.4% 43.6% 79.7% 52.2% 84.5% 46.1% 76.7%
Fixed Income 40.0% 7.7% 53.0% 15.4% 26.7% 3.9% 37.1% 9.3% 26.7% 4.7% 42.0% 9.9%
Cash - - - 2.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%
Alternatives - - 8.5% 3.7% 17.3% 11.0% 19.4% 10.8% 22.6% 13.4%
60/40 Portfolio PIMS Model Single Employer Funds/Plans US Corporate Pension Funds US Public Pension Funds US Defined Benefit Plans
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 1 
 
Panel A. Treasury yields as predictors of future returns. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, Ibbotson Associates
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Panel B. Dividend yields as predictors of future returns. 
 
Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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Source: Shiller (2013). 
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Figure 2. Implied S&P 500 volatility (VIX). Source: CBOE (2013). 
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Figure 3. 
 
Panel A. Realized large U.S. firm market capitalization stock index return volatility. 
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Panel B. Implications of PIMS model assumptions vs. realized large U.S. firm market 
capitalization stock index return volatility. 
 
Rolling 18-Month Annualized Volatility
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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CBOE S&P 500 Implied Correlation Index
January 3, 2007 – Dec 31, 2012
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
(JCJ) January 2008 (KCJ) January 2009 (ICJ) January 2010 (JCJ) January 2011
(KCJ) January 2012  (ICJ-E) JANUARY 2013  (JCJ-E) JANUARY 2014  (KCJ) JANUARY 2015  
 
Figure 4. Implied S&P 500 correlations. Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
25 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
Panel A. Realized correlations between U.S. large cap stocks and 20-year Treasury returns. 
          
 
 
Panel B. Realized correlations between U.S. large cap stocks and 20-year Treasury returns with 
block-bootstrapped 95 percent C.I.s. 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 6. 
Panel A. Allocation trends of U.S. corporate pension plans. 
 
 
Panel B. Allocation trends of U.S. public pension plans. 
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Panel C. Alternative asset allocation trends of U.S. corporate pension plans, public pension 
plans and university endowments and foundations. 
 
 
 
Source: Pensions & Investments Research (2013). 
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